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RECENT DECISIONS
Labor Law: Duty to Bargain Over Decision to Mechanize
Operations-In the recent case of Libby, McNeill and Libby v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission and Obreros
Unidos,' the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the unilateral
economically motivated decision of respondent employer to harvest
its 1968 cucumber crop by mechanical means was not a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining within the meaning of the Wiscon-
sin Employment Peace Act. However, the supreme court addition-
ally held that the respondent had committed an unfair labor prac-
tice under Wisconsin Statutes sections 11 1.06(l)(d) 2 and 111.02(5)3
by refusing to bargain concerning the effects of that decision. The
court sustained that portion of the order of the Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Commission (WERC) which required the respon-
dent to bargain collectively with respect to the effects of the deci-
sion to mechanize its operations, but the matter was remanded for
the purpose of deleting all reference in the order requiring collective
bargaining concerning the mechanization decision itself.
The test applied to distinguish between economically motivated
management decisions which require bargaining and those which
do not was whether the decision would change the basic direction
of the company's activities. It was concluded that most manage-
ment decisions which change the direction of the corporate enter-
prise, involving a change in capital investment, are not bargainable.
Additionally, the court cited with approval the proposition that
there is no duty imposed upon employers to bargain collectively
regarding managerial decisions which lie at the core of entrepre-
neurial control. 4
In adopting the above test, the court rejected the WERC test
which would have required bargaining whenever the decision would
1. 48 Wis. 2d 272, 179 N.W.2d 805 (1970).
2. Wis. STAT. § 11 1.06(l)(d) (1969) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
"[t]o refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of a majority of his employees in
any collective bargaining unit."
3. Wis. STAT. § 111.02(5) (1969) defines "collective bargaining" as
the negotiating by an employer and a majority of his employees in a collective
bargaining unit (or their representatives) concerning representation or terms and
conditions of employment of such employees in a mutually genuine effort to reach
an agreement with reference to the subject under negotiation.
4. 48 Wis. 2d at 283, 179 N.W.2d at 811.
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affect terms and conditions of employment. In so doing, it at-
tempted to delineate those decisions which lie at the core of entre-
preneurial control and also affect conditions of employment, but
are not subjects of a duty to bargain because they are uniquely
management rights. In the instant case, the decision to mechanize
cucumber operations, to the total exclusion of the bargaining unit
members, was considered to be a decision which was not a manda-
tory subject of bargaining because of its concern with the commit-
ment of capital and the basic direction of the enterprise. Such a
decision, the court felt, was a management decision within the
purview of Wisconsin Statutes section 180.30 which requires that
the business and affairs of the corporation be managed by the
board of directors. 5 In so holding the court stated: "Any manage-
ment decision may affect terms and conditions of employment. Not
all decisions are bargainable." 6
The court recognized the apparent lack of cases on the point in
issue in spite of the fact that "as technology has marched unyield-
ingly forward, there have been numerous clashes over the idea of
replacing men with machines. ' ' 7 The test adopted by the court was
based upon recognized cases in the parallel areas of work subcon-
tracting, plant relocation, partial and total liquidation of plant
facilities, and other changes in the basic enterprise wherein the
primary motivation is economic in nature."
The counsel for the WERC had contended that the facts within
Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB,9 a leading case on subcon-
tracting bargaining unit work, were analogous to those at bar. In
Fibreboard, the United States Supreme Court had held that the
decision to subconract out janitorial work previously performed
by members of an existing bargaining unit was a required subject
of bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act.'0 The Su-
5. Id. at 284, 179 N.W.2d at 811.
6. Id. at 281, 179 N.W.2d at 810.
7. Id. at 280, 179 N.W.2d at 809.
8. While Wisconsin has enacted its own "little" Labor Relations Act (Wis. STAT. ch.
S111), it is generally conceded that federal cases are interpretive, if not binding, concerning
legislative intent, particularly in matters of first impression. Such federal cases "are gener-
ally followed so far as applicable by the WERC and. . . [the Wisconsin] Supreme Court."
Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 72 L.R.R.M.
2190, 2191 (Wisconsin Circuit Court, Waushara County, 1969). The parallel between the
National Labor Relations Act and the Wisconsin Statutes is readily apparent
when § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970), and § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), are
compared with Wis. STAT. § 111.06(l)(d) (1969) and § 111.02(5) (1969) respectively.
9. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
10. Id. at 209.
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preme Court of Wisconsin rejected this contention by citing wih
approval the concurring opinions of Justices Stewart, Douglas, and
Harlan, in Fibreboard, which carefully limited the interpretation to
the facts of that case." The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted with
emphasis this statement of the concurring Justices: "Nothing the
Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to
bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions, which lie
at he core of entrepreneurial control."' 2 The concurring Justices
had further stated that the purpose of section 8(d) of the National
Labor Relations Act was clearly to exclude from mandatory bar-
gaining "those management decisions which are fundamental to
the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or which impinge only
indirectly upon employment security."13
The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that the WERC conten-
tion ignored the basic change in capital investment which distin-
guished the decision at bar from the restricted facts of Fibreboard.
The court recognized the constraining effect of later interpretations
as more narrowly defining the permissible application of the rule
enunciated in Fibreboard requiring bargaining with respect to the
business decision itself. 4
In an attempt to resolve the issue of whether an economically
motivated decision to mechanize a portion of a company's opera-
tions is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, the court
relied upon NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 1 5 NLRB v. Transmarine
Navigation Corp., 6 and NLRB v. Royal Plating and Polishing
Company1 7 which involved similar "decision" issues. In Adams
Dairy, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a dairy's
decision to liquidate a part of its business involving the distribution
of milk products through the bargaining unit's driver salesmen and
to distribute its products through independent contractors was not
a required subject of bargaining. In so holding the court recognized
that a basic operational change had taken place which involved
more than just the substitution of one employee for another, and
that, unlike the situation in Fibreboard, there was a change in the
capital structure of Adams Dairy which resulted in a partial liqui-
11. 48 Wis. 2d at 281, 179 N.W.2d at 810.
12. 379 U.S. at 223; quoted in 48 Wis. 2d at 281, 179 N.W.2d at 810.
13. Id.
14. 48 Wis. 2d at 282-84, 179 N.W.2d at 810.
15. 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965).
16. 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967).
17. 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
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dation and a recoupment of capital investment.18 To require other-
wise was considered to be an abridgement of the company's free-
dom to manage its own affairs. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in Transmarine Navigation, held that a decision to
terminate a business and reinvest as part of a joint enterprise was
a fundamental change in the direction and operation of the corpor-
ate enterprise which greatly affected its capital, assets and person-
nel, and, therefore, was not bargainable. 19 Both the Eighth Circuit
and the Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal carefully noted that the
decisions were unstimulated by union animus but were motivated
solely by economics of operation. In Royal Plating and Polishing,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employer faced
with the economic necessity of either moving or consolidating oper-
ations of a failing business would have no duty to bargain with the
union respecting its decision to shut down a portion of its opera-
tions, in the absence of a discriminatory motive.2"
While recognizing Libby's management right, in the absence of
anit-union considerations, to make an economically motivated de-
cision considered to lie at the core of its "entrepreneurial control"
and involving a change in the capital structure of the organization,
the court followed a well established rule when it ordered the re-
spondent to bargain with the union concerning the "effects" of
that decision. That rule states that when an
employment relationship is threatened by a unilateral economic
move by the employer, the federal courts and the National Labor
Relations Board have found an enforceable duty to bargain over
the impact of that decision on the employees. 2'
Supporting cases and decisions are numerous.22 Quoting
Transmarine Navigation, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
Once such a decision is made the employer is still under an obli-
gation to notify the union of its decision so that the union may
be given the opportunity to bargain over the rights of the employ-
18. 350 F.2d at I 11.
19. 380 F.2d at 937.
20. 350 F.2d at 196.
21. 48 Wis. 2d at 285, 179 N.W.2d at 812.
22. Cases cited by the Wisconsin Supreme Court were: NLRB v. Thompson Transport
Co., Inc., 406 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Cooper Thermometer Co., 376 F.2d 684
(2d Cir. 1967); Morrisson Cafeterias Consolidated, Inc., 177 NLRB 113 (1969); Wittock
Supply Co., 171 NLRB 33 (1968); McLoughlin Mfg. Corp., 164 NLRB 140 (1967); Stan-
dard Handkerchief Co., Inc., 151 NLRB 15 (1965).
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ees whose employment status will be altered by the managerial
decision.23
Thus the court recognized that certain actions may be unique
management prerogatives because they involve economically moti-
vated decisions which change the capital structure of the organiza-
tion or which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control of that
organization. In this case the right of the company to make the
decision to mechanize its cucumber picking operations was held to
be such a management prerogative. The court recognized the con-
flicting policies inherent in situations involving the replacement of
men with machines. The policy of the Wisconsin Employment
Peace Act to promote industrial peace and secure regular and ade-
quate income for employees was recognized as being in conflict
with the right of private enterprise to manage its own affairs, under
the facts of this case. 24 The test adopted was not whether the deci-
sion was one which affects "terms and conditions" of employment,
but whether the decision could be said to be one which changed the
basic direction of the company's activities. In adopting this test the
Wisconsin Supreme Court relied heavily upon the concurring opin-
ion of Fibreboard, which clearly excluded from mandatory bar-
gaining "those management decisions which are fundamental to
the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or which impinge only
indirectly upon employment security." Use of the "impinge only
indirectly upon employment security" portion of the test would
clearly have required bargaining as to the decision to mechanize in
this instance, for the bargaining unit jobs were completely elimi-
nated. Such a test is similar to that advocated by the WERC.
However, the tests given above are disjunctive, for the interests to
be served are often conflicting. An extreme recognition of "em-
ployment security" may lead to a restriction in the ability of pri-
vate enterprise to manage its own affairs. Such is not the purpose
of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act.26 Recognition of mana-
gerial decision rights when either part of the test is satisfied, there-
23. 380 F.2d at 939; quoted in 48 Wis. 2d at 285, 179 N.W.2d at 812.
24. 48 Wis. 2d at 280, 179 N.W.2d at 810.
25. 379 U.S. at 223.
26. See 48 Wis. 2d at 280, 179 N.W.2d at 810, which states that the purpose of the
Employment Peace Act, as enacted in Wis. STAT. § 111.01(2) (1969), is to promote "in-
dustrial peace, regular and adequate income for employees and uninterrupted production of
goods and services."
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fore, is not inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of the Act,
promotion of industrial peace.
The Libby case establishes a threshold test for determining
whether a particular decision is a unique management prerogative
because of its bearing upon the ability of private enterprise to
manage and be responsible for its own affairs. Only when this
threshold issue of whether the decision is one which affects the
direction of the corporate enterprise, involving the commitment of
invested capital, is resolved in the negative can consideration be
given to the question of whether the decision itself is bargainable
because of its effects upon terms and conditions of employment.
When the threshold issue is answered affirmatively, the interests of
the bargaining unit are considered sufficiently protected under the
Wisconsin Employment Peace Act by requiring bargaining solely
with regard to the decisions's "effects."
ROBERT J. BoiVIN
Constitutional Law: Testimonial Privilege of Newsmen-It has
long been recognized that there is incumbent upon each citizen a
duty to testify when summoned by a court exercising its lawful
jurisdiction. The imposition of such a testimonial duty is thought
to be a natural and elementary obligation which must be met if our
judicial system is to function in the fair and orderly manner de-
manded by both individual litigants and society.' Although the
parties to a very small and select group of relationships have been
granted testimonial privileges protecting confidential communica-
tions, the courts have been very reluctant to elevate the relationship
of a newsman with his confidential sources to a similar status. 2
Unlike doctors, lawyers, and other professionals who enjoy such a
privilege, 3 newsmen are often forced to choose between incurring a
1. As the United States Supreme Court has stated: "[P]ersons summoned as witnesses
by competent authority have certain minimum duties and obligations which are necessary
concessions to the public interest in the orderly operation of legislative and judicial machi-
nery." United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). See also Blackmur v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421 (1931); and Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1918).
2. The case most often cited for the common law rule that no privilege exists in favor
of communications made to newsmen is People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York
County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936). See also 58 AM. JUR. Witnesses § 546 (1948);
97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 259 (1957); Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 591 (1966).
3. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 209-223 (1945).
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